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“Your cries o babies with no heads ... got smashed onto the walls of Palestine ... 
your screams o Afghanistan babies ... calling me with no arms ... 
having been executed by damn bombs ... belong to the Satan America and its allies ...
at what time your parents have been going through Ramadhan! 
Here I am, your brother ... here I am, coming with a chunk of bombings ... 
will retaliate for your hurt heart ... will retaliate for your bloods ... 
blood for blood ... life for life ... qishash!!2)
Introduction
It is widely accepted that Islamic radicalism in Indonesia forms only a minority amidst
its tolerant and moderate Muslim population.3) Following the Bali bombing in October
2002, much of their underground activism has been decimated and more Muslim
hardliners have been arrested by the government.  Nevertheless, to assume that the
Muslim hardliners no longer pose serious threats is theoretically misleading.  The suicide
bombing in front of the Australian embassy on 9 September 2004 provided clear
evidence that the Muslim radicals are capable of organizing and executing a major
operation within a large urban center, despite the fact that the perpetrators are derived
from “the tiny minority of the Muslim radical minority.” 4)
Abundant scholarly studies on Islamic radicalism in post New Order Indonesia have
considered various theoretical perspectives and angles.  Most of these works, however, do
not answer satisfactorily the following two questions; (1) What constitutes Islamic
radicalism, and (2) What turns radicals into jihadists.  As a result, these studies suffer from
unfocused theoretical arguments on what the term “radical” means.  They seem to lump
together all aspects of Islamic radicalism into one single term: “radical”.  Put slightly
differently, these studies are unable to provide a wide-ranging identification of Islamic
radicalism, distinguishing the “moderate” radical to the most extreme violent one.  
Secondly, these studies accentuate the structural aspect of Islamic radicalism rather
than the “non-structural”.  At best, most of them cannot avoid the analysis of Islam and
the state, faith and politics and the like.5) These studies are of the opinion that the history
of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia is inseparable from the history of Darul Islam (DI)
which tried to Islamize the state in the 1950’s.6) This type of analysis usually stems from
the presumption that there is no way the (re)Islamization process can take place outside
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the structure of power, i.e. the state level.  This “structural” school of thought, as one may
call it, cannot go beyond the state analysis while at the same time it ignores the fact that
society is another target of Islamic radicalism.7)
By all accounts, preliminary findings have been expounded by ICG in its latest
research which tries to make a careful distinction between the two camps within
Indonesian Islamic radicalism; salafi and salafi jihadist, two different entities that have
usually been lumped together as “radical” by the previous studies.8) The ICG defines the
salafi as “a Muslim reformist movement aiming to return Islam to the purity of the
religion as practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and the two generations that followed
him.” 9) The salafi jihadist is defined as “the radical fringe of salafism determined to target
Islam’s enemies through violence, aimed in particular at the United States and its allies.”10)
This paper seeks to elaborate the theological constructs of Islamic radicalism in post
New Order Indonesia, both pure salafis and salafi jihadists.  This paper will present the
Muslim radicals’ ideas on specific theological matters in their own words.  This paper,
therefore, does not aim to explain, for instance, what Islam says about jihad, suicide
bombing, violence, and so forth.
Establishing God’s Law: Beliefs System of Islamic Radicalism
The venture of all types of Islamic radicalism, including the jihadist groups, starts
from the creed that the establishment of Islamic realm based on the Qur’an and Hadith is
regarded as a holy duty.  The main principle is that no man-made entity is allowed to rule
human being, but God’s law.  It is firmly believed by the radicals that democracy is
considered to be novelty (bid‘a) which is not allowed in Islam and, hence, must never be
tolerated.  In Indonesia, one of the main agendas of the Muslim radicals such as Abu
Bakar Ba’asyir, the spiritual leader of the Indonesian Council of Muslim Holy Warriors
(MMI), is to replace Pancasila, a national ideology of the state, with Islamic shari‘ah
(Islamic law).11) They believe that the shariah is a complete and supreme law (nizam
shamil, manhaj al-hayat ) which is universally applicable at any time and space (salih li kulli
zaman wa makan), including for those who live outside of the House of Islam (dar al-Islam).
Pancasila, democracy, socialism, and capitalism must be rejected not only because they
are man-made entities but also because they represent human’s revolt against God’s
law.12) The radicals believe that it is only through God’s law that a just and harmonious
social order can be achieved.  In order to maintain God’s law on earth, a struggle ( jihad)
is imperative in order to “decontaminate” Islamic practice from pagan, anthropomorphic
threatening accretions.  On the basis of the Qur’anic injunctions, the radicals believe that
they are created by God as the best community to command which is good and prohibit
which is bad (amr ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar ).13)
One of the underlying assumptions for the establishment of the Islamic state is that
there is a strong correlation—which is presumably set and controlled by God—between
the state of physical nature and human nature, society and morality which brings about
the cosmology of Islamic radicalism.14) Social order can only be maintained by upholding
God’s law.  On the contrary, social disorder and ailments are but a symptom of the
individual’s moral transgressions on God’s law, both on inside Muslim community as well
as outside.  The same assumption is used in understanding the natural law of the universe
by arguing that within the level of obedience to God both the harmony and disharmony
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of the nature can be found.  This means that all catastrophes in this world [e.g. tsunami,
earthquake, hurricane, flood, famine, long drought, and other physical destructions] are
believed to be the direct consequence of human’s disobedience to God.  For the radicals,
the only way of overcoming this disharmony is by returning to the authenticity of Islam,
which consists of the Qur’an and Hadith in the very literal sense.  Any moral illness that
can cause the degradation of human dignity can only be cured by Islamic precepts and
norms.
Along with the establishment of the Islamic realm, the radicals develop the doctrine of
the inerrancy of the authoritative text with its approved commentaries, consisting of the
Qur’an, Hadith, and the sharia.  In order to function well, they require some “flesh-and-
blood” authority to interpret these texts in adapting to the social changes and challenges.
The need to employ a stringent literal understanding of the texts among the radicals does
not imply that interpretation is not required, especially amidst the rapidly changing
realities of their time.  With regard to this need, religious authority is an integral element
as a supreme body to endorse the application of God’s law at the praxis level.  
Authority is vested in a limited number of individuals.  Scholarship and formal training
may play an important role in the selection of the leaders, but the crucial factor is
charisma: that special heavenly grace (baraka) that sets one man (virtually never is it a
woman) apart from the rest of the “enclave” members.  That man is to combine virtue,
decision-making ability, and mastery of the tradition.  It is interesting to note that although
Sayyid Qutb had considerable renown as a Qur’anic scholar (being the writer of Signpost
on the Road ), memoirs written by his disciples stand out in relief his personality traits such
as simplicity, stringency, courage, and the like, to be crowned by martyrdom at the
gallows.15)
The beliefs system of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia has been forged through various
ways, either in the sense of the availability or the absence of the authoritative persons.  In
the case of pure salafis, local authority seems to be sufficient in making the mindset of
Islamic radicalism.  This local authority has been represented by such charismatic figures
as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Ja’far Umar Thalib, Habib Rizieq, and many others.  For the salafi
jihadists, the making of radicalism can be traced from an intellectual genealogy where
Afghan jihadists veterans play significant roles.  Among the most venerated mentors of the
salafi jihadists are international jihadists such as bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mullah
Omar, Abdullah Azam, and the like.
When Violence Becomes Sacred 
By and large, there are two ways of establishing the Islamic realm.  The first is by
means of a peaceful way of transformation as advocated by such radicals as Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir.16) He advocates the application of Shari‘ah in all aspects of polity; constitution
and legal system, banking system, and other aspects of public life.  As an ex-political
activist of the Islamic Masyumi party, Ba’asyir tends to use politics in its wider sense as a
means of exercising his Islamic ideology.  This reminds us of what Mawdudi, a well-
known Muslim ideologue of the twenteeth century from Pakistan, advocated in Islamizing
state and society.  Although Mawdudi’s ideological elaborations included the
appropriation of the modern political myth of revolution, this appropriation remained
more semantic than pragmatic.17) More importantly, both of them did not endorse
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violence as the means for achieving the Islamic revolution.
The peaceful way of transforming Islamic values takes various methods, one of which
is, da’wa (propagation).  The radicals who focus on this method emphasize personal
piety.  For this group, the priority is for individuals to practice a pure understanding of
Islam on the basis of the Qur’an and very selective Hadith.  This entails not only
propagation and individual piety, but a program to eliminate any popular practices
which they consider as inauthentic Islam.  The second method is advice (maw‘idhah
diniyyah) based on religious injunctions.  It is widely accepted, not only among the
radicals but also among the Muslims, that ulamas (religious scholars) are responsible to
advise leaders about Islamic legislation and regulations.  The third peaceful method is
uswah hasanah (exemplary deeds) to be followed by the rest of the Muslims.  This peaceful
method is applied from the verse saying that Muslims should call others to the path of
God by means of hikmah (wisdom) and maw‘idhah hasanah (good advice), and they shall
debate over certain matters in a proper manner.  In addition, there is a verse in the
Qur’an saying that Muslims were born as the best community whose responsibility is
commanding which is good and prohibiting which is formidable.18) In a Hadith, the
Prophet is reported to say: “Whoever of the Muslims encounters bad conduct (munkar) of
others, he is responsible of changing this conduct by hands (power), if it is unlikely,
then it should be done by oral advice, and if it is still unlikely, then it should be done by
his heart.  But this is considered to be the weakest manifestation of belief in Islam.” 19)
The second way is by means of violent acts.  In this context, there are two different
attitudes among the radicals regarding the use of violent methods in bringing about the
social change they might wish.  The first attitude is derived from what the ICG refers to as
salafi radicals who consider the use of violent methods as a last resort after the gradual and
peaceful means are not successful.  The jihadist radicals, however, accept without any
reserve the use of violent methods in executing their ideology as it has been practiced by
some fringe of radicals in Indonesia such as Jemaah Islamiyah ( JI) and the Bali Bombing
perpetrators.  They argue that the use of violent acts to eradicate “evils” on earth is
considered as jihad, a holy duty, as a manifestation of the Qur’anic doctrine:
“commanding which is good and forbidding which is abominable” (amar ma‘ruf nahi
munkar).
With regard to the use of violent methods by the radicals, the question would be: why
do the radicals advocate and perpetrate violent acts?  In Najib Ghadbian’s view, there are
four possible answers to this question.  First, structural reasons would possibly justify their
violent acts.  These jihadist radicals exist in political and economic environments
characterized by extreme political repression and economic deprivation and disparity.
Second, it has something to do with the way the radicals understand their sacred texts
which is usually literal.  Third, they function with one-sided, often paranoiac
understanding of the world, particularly in relation to the way they construct and perceive
their “enemy.”  Fourth, transformation of jihadist worldview and ideology by means of
massive volunteering of young Muslims around the world to fight with their fellow
Muslims against the foreign occupation in the land of Muslim countries.  This
transformation took place through sending young Muslims by jihadist organizations all
over the world into the land of Islam regarded to be the battlefield of jihad such as
Afghanistan.20)
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The debate between the jihadist radicals and the salafi over the use of violence centers
around two points; the first is the significance of violence and the second is the theological
construct for the justification of violence.  For the first radical group, oppressive political
rulers or infidel powers will not surrender until confronted with power.  They believe that
Islam urges believers to resort to jihad to fight what they consider evil, a term which is
defined as attitudes, acts, behavior transgressing the law of God as sanctioned in the
Qur’an and the Prophet’s tradition.  The only way to uphold the superiority of Islam is by
punishing whoever transgresses God’s law.  All transgressors, in the radicals’ conception,
are thus identified as God’s enemies, no matter whether they are fellow Muslims or, let
alone, non-Muslims (kafir).  In today’s Indonesian context, the Western hegemony has
become the prime target of the jihadist violent acts in retaliation for perceived aggression
by the West, or what the radicals more frequently term as a “Christian-Zionist
conspiracy,” against Muslim around the world.21) To justify this they cite a verse of the
Qur’an 2: 120, “Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with thee unless thou
follow their form of religion.”22) Most Indonesian radicals, in the ICG’s prediction,
would not go too far.23)
The salafi group, however, sees the use of violence as counterproductive in the midst of
the Islamization process by giving justification to regimes or foreign powers for continued
repression and hegemony.  This group tends to see the use of violence as rooted in the
“ambition to dictate, control and correct individual behavior, and takes the form of
occasional punitive actions against individuals or groups regarded as ‘bad Muslims.’” 24)
Regarding the doctrine of jihad, they regard it as the last resort and it is restrained by
several strict considerations and conditions, including weighing the benefits against the
great cost, refraining from excessive violence, and having overall respect and compassion
for human life.25)
Later on in its development, the violent method executed by the jihadist radicals has
been coupled with “irregular war” or terror against all infidels (kafir), particularly the US
and its allies.26) The violent method was not necessarily accompanied with killing as many
innocent people as possible.  Basically, terror or violence without victims was considered
successful if the message was able to be delivered to, and understood by, the radicals’
enemies.27) It was not until the September 11 did the dramatic change occur in the
execution of violent methods by the jihadist radicals.  Not only were violent acts executed
against innocent casualties, but this also involved as many life casualties as possible.  A
series of suicide bombings in Indonesia, since the Bali bombing in 12 October 2002,
Marriot hotel blast in 5 August 2003, and the bombing in front of the Australian embassy
in 9 September 2004, has shown how central the violent mentality of the jihadist radicals
is.  
The concept of violence in the minds of jihadist radicals never solely means crime; it is
a self-fulfilling prophesy in search for God’s favor.  Killing, therefore, never solely means
murder; it signifies a holy duty of upholding and defending Islam against their enemies.
That is why maintaining the existence of an enemy in the radicals’ conception is necessary
in order to reconfirm the truth they hold.  For Indonesian jihadist radicals, the US is
perceived to seek only to oppress, divide, and further colonizes the land of Islam.  The US
international policy in the case of Israel-Palestine conflict, its invasion to Afghanistan and
Iraq are but the legitimate rationale for the execution of violent acts against the US with its
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allies, be they military or civilians.  Their enemies are, therefore, sociologically and
politically constructed on the basis of textual justifications.28)
The Centrality of Jihad
In its etymological sense, jihad comes from an Arabic root j-h-d, the basic meaning of
which is striving or effort.  Jihad is frequently used in classical texts with the closely related
meaning of struggle, and very often, fights.  Jihad does not originally mean “holy war,” a
term which is frequently misunderstood by many in parallel with its counterpart in
Judeo-Christianity tradition as “Crusades” or “Just War.” 29) Muslims themselves have
disagreed throughout the history of Islam about the meaning of the term.  Even though
jihad is never explicitly used to mean warfare in the Qur’an, its connotation under qital
(literally, fighting) is understood by the Muslims as a theological basis for warfare against
the enemies of the early Muslim community.  This word is usually cited from the
Qur’anic verses, “striving in the Path of God,” and has been variously interpreted to mean
moral striving and armed or physical struggle.  The aim of jihad, as frequently understood
by the majority of Muslims, is to attain the complete supremacy of Islam, as one can learn
from the Qur’an.30)
It has to be acknowledged that jihad has become one of the most important
vocabularies in the dictionary of the radicals which has frequently been employed as a
theological basis to justify their violent actions.  In Indonesia, jihad has been interpreted
in various ways, depending on which camp one subscribes to.  Given the commonality of
jihad doctrine among all radical wings, they differ over whether jihad must be seen in
generic or specific sense.  For the pure salafi radicals, jihad tends to be defined in broader
terms as taking whatever actions considered necessary to improve the quality of one’s
own faith, even though there is a certain context when jihad must be understood as
holy war.  The jihadist radicals, however, define it merely as fight or battle (which is in
Arabic literally means ghazw or qital ) against all enemies of God in order to maintain
Islam as the only true and supreme religion.31) Both groups agree that jihad must be
waged against non-Muslim powers that oppress the Muslims all over the world, and
thus not against fellow Muslims.  
In relation to the juridical status of jihad in Islam, whereas salafi radicals put jihad as a
collective obligation of the Muslim community ( fard kifaya), salafi jihadists place it as an
obligation of each individual Muslim ( fard ‘ayn), thus it is not different from other
religious obligations in Islam such as prayers, almsgiving, fasting, and pilgrimage to
Mecca.32) The salafi radicals argue that it is only in emergency situations, when the dar al-
Islam comes under unexpected attacks, that all Muslims have to participate in jihad.
Under normal circumstances, however, an individual Muslim need not take part as long
as other fellow Muslims carry the burden for all in defending the realm of Islam.  This
theological stance is based on a classical concept of Islamic jurisprudence which was
developed within the first three centuries of Islam.33)
The salafi jihadists, nevertheless, base their argument on the perception that the Muslim
community all over the world is under the threat of the Zionist-neo-crusaders conspiracy.
This condition is perceived to be a sound justification to wage jihad for all Muslims
against all enemies of Allah.34) In justifying jihad as an individual obligatory, Imam
Samudra, a mastermind of the Bali bombing, quotes a verse of the Qur’an as follows:
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“Fighting is prescribed upon you, and ye dislike it.  But it is possible that ye dislike a thing
which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you.  But Allah knoweth,
and ye know not” (QS. 2: 216).  Samudra describes those mujahidin (Muslim warriors)
who take part in the front line of the battle as ahl al-thughur (the warriors of front guard).
During the time of the Prophet Muhammad, he adds, when the status of jihad became
individually obligatory, all Muslims were classified as ahl al-thughur.  During the Tabuk
war, for instance, there were three companions of the Prophet who reportedly deserted
from the war, and the Prophet gave them a gentle punishment by excluding them from
communication with other companions.  No body from ahl al-thughur, Samudra asserts,
has not gone into battlefield.  All of the founders of four Islamic law schools, Ibn
Taymiyyah and his disciple, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, are said to have fought against
non-believers following their predecessors.35)
Another debate raised by the salafi and salafi jihadists centers around whether jihad
must be waged defensively or offensively.  Basically, the salafi camp tends to see jihad in
defensive terms, rather than offensive ones.  As in the case of religious conflict in Maluku,
they perceived the Muslim community to be under attack of non-Muslims, and
performing jihad in this region must be seen as obligatory.36) The jihadist camp, however,
tend to see jihad in offensive terms (hujumi ).  Imam Samudra and Imam Mukhlas, the
other Bali bombing perpetrator, argue that the best form of defense is attack.37) The aim
of jihad, moreover, is not merely to protect other fellow Muslims, but also to destroy any
obstacle in the way of upholding Islam and to strike fear into the hearts of all enemies of
Allah, among whom all hypocrites, idolaters, and kafirs should be included.  
The question is, until when should the jihad be waged?  Until there is no fitnah
(oppression), and until all human beings in the world profess the truth of Islam or they
convert to Islam, says Imam Samudra.38) To justify his theological stance, he quotes a
verse in the Qur’an, “And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and
there prevails justice and faith in Allah altogether and everywhere; But if they cease,
verily Allah Doth see all that they do” (QS. 8: 39).  He also quotes two Hadith of the
Prophet, “I (Muhammad) was sent by Allah approaching to the Day of Judgment by
sword until Allah is the only God worshipped and there is no associate with Him” (as
narrated by Bukhari-Muslim).  Another Hadith is that “I was sent by Allah to fight
against all humans until they profess ‘la ilaha illa Allah’ (there is no God but Allah), if they
have already uttered it, verily Allah will secure their properties and blood, except for the
right of Islam, and their reckoning of Allah” (as narrated by Bukhari-Muslim).39)
In constructing the concept of jihad, salafi jihadists have been very much inspired by
Ibn Taymiyyah who calls jihad an individual obligation for all Muslims, and who says that
if it is not possible to fight unbelievers without killing Muslims, then those killings are
permissible.  In addition, based on Abdullah Azzam’s (a famous al-Qaeda’s theoretician)
influential twelve-volume series on training for jihad entitled Tarbiyah Jihadiyah (The
Education of Jihad), Imam Samudra maintains that there are four steps of jihad.  The first
step is called self-control in which jihad is not yet commanded.  All Muslims should be
patient in facing all oppressions, mockeries and disdains of the unbelievers.  This step has
been experienced by some companions of the Prophet, Bilal bin Rabah and Yasir’s
family who have been tortured by their unbeliever bosses due to their conversion to
Islam.  The second step is when Muslims are allowed, not necessarily commanded, to
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perform jihad as a self-defense if they are treated badly by unbelievers.  This is based on
the Qur’anic verses as follows: “To those against whom war is made, permission is given
(to fight), because they are wronged—and verily, Allah is Most Powerful for their aid.
(They are) those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, (for no
cause) except that they say, “Our Lord is Allah” (QS. 22: 39–40).  The third step is
when jihad is obliged to be performed limitedly, only against those who fight against
Muslims.  This is inferred from a verse of the Qur’an, “Fight in the cause of Allah those
who fight you, but do not transgress limits for Allah loveth not transgressors” (QS. 2: 190).
The last step is when jihad becomes an obligation to fight all non-Muslims and idolaters.
This happens when all of the three previous steps have been through, and the jihadists
believe that this step is Allah’s final pronouncement which has abrogated all truces and
treatises of the Prophet Muhammad with the non-believers.  This step has been deduced
from the verse: “Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that
forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the Religion of Truth, from
among the People of the Book until they pay the jizyah (poll tax) with willing submission,
and feel themselves subdues (QS. 9: 29).  Another verse is also referred to as “... And fight
the pagans all together as you fight you all together ...” (QS. 9: 36).40)
Jihad must be waged for the sake of other fellow Muslims in retaliation to the
oppression and torture executed by all Allah’s enemies.  For the Muslim radicals, either
pure salafis or jihadists, the Muslim community all over the world should be united in
facing those aggressors because all Muslims are brethren to each other.  Muslims are
depicted as a unified body; if a certain organ suffers from injury the others must feel it.
The empathy of other Muslims towards the oppressed and tortured ones must be shown
in the form of transnational solidarity through jihad.  
Looking into Martyrdom (Istishhad )
Death in the path of God ( fi sabil Allah ) serves as the last destination of the radicals’
ventures.41) This type of death, in the radicals’ conception, qualifies as a highly honored
death in which God promises an intimate encountering with Him and dating with angels
in heaven.  In Islam, as in other great religions, this doctrine is called martyrdom (shahid ),
and the process in which Muslims seek to die in this qualification is called istishhad
(looking into shahid ).  The qualification of martyrdom is perceived by the radicals to be at
the highest and most esteemed stratification of all deaths.  With this qualification,
martyrdom is the only type of death with which all radicals, especially the salafi jihadists,
are obsessed.  In Islam, all warriors falling down during jihad or the battle (ghazwas )
against all enemies of Allah are believed to be martyrs.  As in the case of jihad, shahadat
has a sound and clear justification in the Qur’an, such as QS 3: 169 and QS 22: 58–59.42)
From these verses it is clear that the radicals understand the concept shahadat in the sense
of immortality or eternal life.  These verses imply that those who are slain or die (shahid )
in the jihad battlefield are not really dead; in fact they are to receive a dignified reward in
the hereafter.  The term shahid, the basic meaning of which is “witness,” with its
derivatives, occurs over fifty times in the Qur’an signifying its usage as witness here on
earth to the oneness of God, the apostleship of Muhammad, and the truth of the faith.
Witnesses are not in a category by themselves but together with those who have found
favor with God such as the prophets, the righteous, and the truthful.43)
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In Islam, the ideal martyr is he who strives in the path of God “with his hand, his
tongue, and with his heart.”  Yet striving only with the heart is considered as the weakest
of faith.44) This emphasis on outward struggle, however, does not imply wild and
uncontrolled warfare.  Rather, it advocates a regulated struggle for the good and against
evil.  While the ideal martyr in Islam is the one who falls on the battlefield, actual
fighting is not an absolute requirement for martyrdom.  Islam, moreover, has its martyrs
who silently and bravely endure torture and death.  It is believed that the martyr deserves
an exalted station with God and he or she will carry the marks of his sacrifice with him to
be displayed even in heaven.45)
In Indonesia, pure salafis and salafi jihadists hold different views regarding the practices
of self-martyring operation.  The pure salafis tend to consider the practice of self-martyring
as in the case of September 11 as novelty or innovation which is forbidden in Islam.
Whereas the second group represented by such individuals as Imam Samudra strongly
believes that self-martyring is an integral part of jihad which is strongly recommended for
every adult Muslim to perform.  Samudra calls the self-martyring operation as istimata
(looking for death).  In supporting his theological stance, Samudra quotes legal opinions
of Muslim jurists such as Yusuf Qardawi who said that self-martyring operations are
permissible only in specific area such as Palestine, and Nawaf Hail al-Takrari who said
that these kinds of operation are not restricted to Palestine only.  In addition, Samudra
also bases his reasoning on the practice of ahl al-thughur by quoting a narrative of Sufyan
ibn ‘Uyaynah, a religious clerics of the third generation of the Prophet (tabi‘un ) and the
grand master of Imam Shafi‘i, who is reportedly said that “if you encounter Muslims are
in dispute one another (over a matter), follow the path of Muslim holy warriors
(mujahidin ) and ahl al-thughur.”46) In Samudra’s opinion, both have an exalted place
beside, and closer to, Allah compared to those ulamas who only sit, learn and teach
religious knowledge (qaidin ) to students.  He takes into account some contemporary
jihadists as ahl al-thughur, such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abdullah Azam,
Mullah Omar, Sulayman Aby Ghayth, and many others.  In order to support his
argument, he refers to a Qur’anic verse as follows: “Not equal are those who sit (at
home) and receive no hurt, and those who strive and fight in the cause of Allah with their
goods and their persons.  Allah hath granted higher to those who strive and fight with
their goods and persons than to those who sit (at home)” (QS. 4: 95).
The salafi jihadists who operated several self-martyring bombings in Bali, Marriot
hotel, and in front of the Australian embassy would not perceive their death to be in vain.
They are preoccupied with a belief that their death serves only as an entry point in the
long passage to entering God’s heaven and dating with His beautiful angels.  Due to this
reason, it is no wonder that they name the executor of the self-martyring operations as a
“groom” (they do not have “brides” as the executors are usually men) to signify that the
self-martyring executors will be greeted by God’s angels in heaven.47) It is also reported
that before the operation, a discussion to elect who will be the executor(s) is held, and an
oath (bay’at ) must be taken.  Interestingly, it is also said that each jihadists involved in the
operation expects to be elected as the executor.  As soon as one is elected he will be
delighted with the decision, and those who are not will cry for missing the invaluable
moment in their life.48)
In the view of salafi jihadists, self-martyring operation (istimata or istishhad ) is different
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from committing suicide which is forbidden in Islam.  While self-martyring operation
must be based on the intention to protect Muslims and to uphold Islam, committing
suicide is a silly act which is based on frustration, and it has nothing to do with upholding
religion.  There is no reward for the self-martyr except for God’s heaven, whereas the
reward for those who commit suicide is hell.  In addition, the self-martyring operation
should include the following elements: (1) the operators must have a strong presumption
that they are likely to be killed in the operation; (2) the operation is intended to topple
down the enemy’s morality; (3) the operation is intended to invoke the spirit of jihad and
courage of the Muslims; (4) in the operation, the operator might be killed either by
enemy’s missile, or; (5) he might be killed by his own missile.49)
Concluding Remarks
It is clear from the above description that the picture of Indonesian Islamic radicalism
is not as simple as many have generally perceived.  The categorization of the radical
Muslims into two camps, pure salafis and salafi jihadists, have been quite important to
understanding the reality of Islamic radicalism in post New Order Indonesia.  It helps one
understand more clearly what constitutes Indonesian Islamic radicalism.  However, the
question of how far this categorization represents the objective picture of Islamic
radicalism in Indonesia undoubtedly needs further investigation.  In so doing, abundant
perspectives can be employed to approach the topic.  Far from the ambition to provide a
comprehensive picture of Islamic radicalism, the theological perspective used in this
paper rests on an assumption that religious texts contribute significantly to shaping the
mindset of the radicals.  
Indeed, both pure salafi and salafi jihadists use highly selective textual sources which are
mainly taken from their Middle Eastern mentors.  Both agree with one another on
certain points, but differ on other points.  The intellectual origins of the pure salafis
usually return to the texts written by the mentors of Muslim Brotherhood (ikhwan al-
muslimin) such as Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna and Abu A‘la al-Mawdudi.  On the other
hand, the salafi jihadists employ religious texts written by international contemporary
jihadists such as Abdullah Azam with his translated twelve series on the training of jihad.
These texts have been mainly transferred intellectually by the veterans of Afghan jihadists
and they regard their mentors as ahl al thughur, ulamas whose fatwas deserve to be
followed than other ulamas.  These texts are easily accessible in Indonesia due to
translation and publication efforts by some local publications.
The tendency of picking up certain religious texts instead of others does not happen
without any precedence.  This indicates that there is a process of natural selection among
the radical fringes to contest a certain radical standpoint over others.  This dynamic
intellectual contestation happens mainly due to an open democratization process which
has occurred after the collapse of the New Order regime.  It enables everybody to access
freely any radical discourses based on their own preference without any fear of being
oppressed by the government as happened before.  As a result, any religious meaning
embedded in every religious doctrine such as jihad and istishhad has been contested and
reproduced by radical groups from different angles.  In the future, it is predicted that this
contestation of meaning will continue to occur with a larger and more intense scale
provided that it can be managed fairly by the government without necessarily interfering
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in the process of public debates.
To the question of what turns salafis into jihadists, no convincing arguments have been
developed so far.  ICG, however, has made a preliminary assumption that there have
been defining moments throughout the history of Indonesia, often associated with
domestic repression and violence, as a departing moment where the split between the two
takes shape.  ICG identifies three events which happened during 1998–1999 and which
brought the split.  The first was the February fatwa by the World Islamic Front, led by bin
Laden, calling for attacks on Americans with their allies and interests in Indonesia, and a
jihad against Christians and the Jews.  The second was the fall of the Suharto regime (May
1998) and the return of JI leaders to Indonesia (late 1999), and the third was the outbreak
of communal conflicts in Ambon (early 1999).50)
It should be pointed out that the existence of salafism in Indonesia cannot be
terminated, if one believes that the basic principles of democracy and multiculturalism
need to be maintained in Indonesia.  Instead, what needs to be done is to monitor the
spread of the jihadist ideas in order to avoid the outbreak of jihadist operations.  This has
become one of the security concerns of the Indonesian government in dealing with
several jihadists operations more recently.  Dealing with jihadism itself, borrowing ICG’s
words, is “far too complex for simple, silver bullet solutions.”51) But, it is important to note
that the spread of the jihadists ideas must be opposed by counter ideas supported by the
salafi groups, not by moderate and, let alone, liberal Muslim thinkers.
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